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1. Introduction: Donors in the Western Balkans - from 
emergency aid to democracy promotion
1
                                                                                                   
International donor involvement in the Western Balkans
2
 began two 
decades ago in response to the rapid and often violent transitions in 
the region from authoritarian socialist regimes to states gradually 
developing political and economic systems similar to their 
neighbours in Western Europe. As was the case elsewhere across 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, much of the aid was 
channelled through civil society (or what were deemed to represent 
a fledgling civil society in countries with little or no experience of 
such activity or its institutions). International donors became 
involved in an attempt to consolidate as well as induce change, but 
also to spread western values and facilitate the integration of the 
region within European and global structures. During this period 
there have been numerous attempts to co-ordinate the activities of 
                                                 
1
 The research for this booklet was carried out as part of a project which was 
funded by the Balkan Trust for Democracy and Compagnia di San Paolo, led by the 
Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN). 
2
 Used here to refer to Albania and the countries that were formerly part of 
Yugoslavia – though not Slovenia, which has been an EU member since 2004. 
  
[2] 
the numerous international donor agencies, private foundations 
and bi-lateral donors that operate in the region, with the aim both 
of maximizing the value of aid, and ensuring sustainable exit 
strategies and long-term impact. 
With donor activities increasingly directed to other parts of the 
world (in particular, the Middle East and north Africa), and the 
global financial crisis triggering the most profound rationalization of 
donor funding and priorities, democracy promotion and the 
development of civil society in the Western Balkans is under 
immense pressure. The limited and much reduced funds that 
remain available to the region have to be used carefully and 
targeted effectively. At this critical time, as never before, it is 
important to take stock of the past and current strategies; to review 
the practices and priorities of international donors, identify what 
has worked and what has failed, and offer recommendations for 
effective leadership and deployment in the (long) period leading up 
to EU enlargement. Donors, investors, local civil society activists as 
well as the academic community each require strategies for 
improving the current situation in order to foster long-term 
sustainability of the civil society sector in the Western Balkans. 
This study will attempt to answer a number of inter-linked 
questions:  
1. How do the donors that operate across the Western Balkans 
understand ‘civil society development’? Do they support the 
development of civil society organisations as a value in itself, or 
is their assistance used as a method of addressing other 
political/ economic and social reform areas/issues? 
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2. What proportion of aid is deployed towards supporting 
watchdog activities, capacity-building, networking or activism? 
3. What are the preferred mechanisms for delivering support 
(project grants, tenders)? 
4. Is duplication of initiatives, or indeed conflicts between donors, 
really such a problem? Does co-ordination take place, 
informally if not formally? Are there any synergies and the 
exchange of best practice? 
5. Is there real and effective collaboration between donors and 
local stakeholders, especially local civil society organisations 
(CSOs)? If so, at what stage (i.e. design, implementation, and 
evaluation) and how does it occur? 
6. Do donors value the networking and knowledge formation 
roles that CSOs can fulfil? 
Any attempt to answer these questions and to evaluate donor 
assistance channelled through civil society in the successor states of 
the former Yugoslavia and Albania must situate itself within the 
extensive literature critiquing foreign donor assistance for civil 
society development.
3
 Study after study has concluded that post-
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 See in particular, R. Mandel, ‘Seeding Civil Society’, in C.M. Hann, Postsocialisms: 
Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, London: Routledge, 2002; J. Wedel, 
Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid toEastern Europe, 1989-
1998, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001; B.A. Cellarius and C. Staddon, 
‘Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations, Civil Society and Democratization 
in Bulgaria’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.16, No.1, 2002, pp.182–222; 
S. Sampson, ‘The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania’, in C. 
Hann and E. Dunn , K.F.F. Quigley, ‘Lofty Goals, Modest Results: Assisting Civil 
Society in Eastern Europe’, in M. Ottaway and T. Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue: 
Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2000, pp.191–216. 
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socialist civil society is weak.
4
 We are reminded, by a host of 
scholars researching the post-communist region from within various 
academic disciplines, that despite the extensive efforts of foreign 
donors, individual participation and involvement in civic 
associations is found to be low and in some cases lower than in 
post-authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world.
5
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 Howard, Marc Morjé. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. 
Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Crotty, Jo. 
‘Managing Civil Society: Democratization and the Environmental Movement in a 
Russian Region,’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 36 (2003): 489-508; 
Rose, Richard. ‘How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe,’ Journal of 
Democracy Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001): 93-106; Raiser, Martin, Christian Haerpfer, 
Thomas Nowotny, and Claire Wallace. Social Capital in Transition: A First Look at 
the Evidence. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001. 
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 Petrova, Tsveta and Sidney Tarrow. ‘Transactional and Participatory Activism in 
the Emerging European Polity the Puzzle of East-Central Europe,’ Comparative 
Political Studies Vol. 40, No. 1 (2007): 76. 
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2. Research Methodology and Design                                                           
Since there is no reliable, up-to-date and complete directory of 
international donors involved in the region, the first task was to 
establish a database of multilateral, bilateral and private 
foundations active in the region during the 2010-2011 financial 
year. This was undertaken by the Balkan Civil Society Development 
Network (BCSDN), our research partner in the region, from various 
existing lists and databases maintained by the large donors and 
international agencies operating regionally and in individual 
countries.  
In terms of identifying and categorising potential respondents, the 
first distinction to be made was between those donors focusing on 
specific countries, and those engaged across the region. Donors 
were deemed to be focusing on a particular country if there was a 
country-based office, or a country ‘desk’ within the organisation, 
and were deemed to be operating ‘regionally’ if there was one 
office covering the whole region, either within or outside the 
Western Balkans. Supra-national or intergovernmental institutions 
were defined to be multilateral (e.g. World Bank, UN, EU); and 
governmental development agencies and embassies were defined 
as bilateral (e.g. SIDA, Dutch Embassy in Skopje). For the purposes 
of this research, private foundations were defined either as trusts, 
charities or endowments (e.g. German Marshall Fund).   
As part of an initial scoping exercise, a questionnaire
6
 was created 
and included: 62 multilateral agencies; 57 agencies that were 
bilateral development agencies; 78 private foundations; and two 
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pooled donors (i.e. the Balkan Trust for Democracy and the 
European Fund for the Balkans). For the final list of agencies 
contacted, the initial database was narrowed to 71 priority donors, 
of which there were 32 completed questionnaires. There were 16 
additional responses from other organizations contacted by the 
research team, bringing the total number of responses to 48 (see 
full list in Annex 1) – which is a response rate of 37%. However, the 
sample included private, bilateral, and multilateral donors active in 
the countries targeted by the research, which provides a good 
spread of respondents for the analysis. The final response rate 
reflects the following:  
Several organisations claiming that they did not have the sufficient 
time and resources to complete the survey; private donors and two 
multi-lateral donors indicating that although they were involved in 
civil society development, they no longer did so in the Western 
Balkans; organisations contacting the research team to indicate that 
they would not participate in the study since their activities were 
based around certain programmatic areas, or that they did not 
consider their organisation to be a ‘donor’ or to be engaged in 
donor activities. 
A final observation about the data collection process is that it was 
difficult to reconstruct any characteristics of the civil society 
development strategies of donor organisations that had ceased 
their operations, even if the departure was relatively recent (i.e. 
within the previous 12 months). For example, we were unable to 
obtain any information from the GTZ (the bilateral German 
development agency) office in Albania, even though it had closed 
only in January 2011. Similarly, DFID (the UK bilateral development 
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agency) - which was a key donor in Bosnia in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, as well as across the region generally - has 
scaled back its operations significantly to the extent that it only has 
one functioning office in the region (Pristina). Similarly, it proved 
very difficult to access precise information on activities and the 
substantive nature of DFID activities, despite their prominence in 
the region since the mid-1990s. It is also important to explain why 
there is an absence of data on Croatia. As a result of impending EU 
membership, progress in political and social development, and 
donor priorities having shifted to other parts of the world, many of 
the multilateral donors that were active in the country until recently 
have now left, and those that remain are scaling down their 
activities dramatically. It was therefore decided not to include 
Croatia in the study, other than as part of regional initiatives by 
donors operating across the Western Balkans. Although there were 
responses from donors active within each country in the region, 
response rates varied significantly and there was no stratification by 
country, making it difficult to undertake any cross-country 
comparisons.  
For the next phase of the research, and in light of the 
aforementioned difficulties with collecting survey data and with 
response rates, the research team decided to identify and focus on 
a number of ‘priority’ multilateral donors: UNDP, OSCE, DG 
Enlargement (including the EU Delegation offices in each country), 
and the World Bank. The priority donors also included bilateral 
development agencies that have been most visible in the region, 
including USAID (USA), SIDA (Sweden), and GTZ (Germany). There 
were also a number of high-profile private foundations on the 
priority list, including OSI / OSF (Open Society Institute / 
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Foundation). The data from the responses will be analysed in the 
next section.  
The questionnaire included several open-ended items so that 
narrative data were also collected from each of the respondents 
regarding their civil society development practice. 
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3. Preliminary Survey Results  
The 48 respondents were based in each of the countries in the 
region, as well as offices in EU member states and the US. Not 
surprisingly, the start of the involvement for most of the local 
offices and regional programmes in the Western Balkans began 
sometime between 1991 and 1996 for most donor organisations 
that completed the survey, which coincides with the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and the various conflicts in the region during this time. 
For the reasons outlined above, there were no responses from 
Croatia. There were only two responses for Kosovo (both major 
bilateral donors), two for Montenegro (both major multi-lateral 
donors), five for Macedonia, six for Serbia, and seven each for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. The remainder of the responses 
(n=19) came from offices that focused more broadly on the region. 
The results are shown in Table A: of the respondents, 19 were 
private foundations, 16 were bilateral development agencies, and 
the remaining 13 were international or multi-lateral organisations. 
TABLE A: Number of respondents by country. (n=48) 
Country Freq. % 
Albania 7 14.58 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 14.58 
Kosovo 2 4.17 
Macedonia 5 10.42 
Montenegro 2 4.17 
Serbia 6 12.50 
Regional 19 39.58 
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There is quite a strong regional consensus on the identification of 
the single most important donor in the Western Balkans: of the 45 
responses to the question of ranking donors, 35 identified either the 
European Commission or European Union as most important. 
Interestingly, four of the respondents, including both bilateral donor 
country offices in Kosovo, replied that USAID was the most 
important donor. However, three of these respondents then placed 
the EC/EU as the second-most important donor. Seventeen of the 
responses identified USAID or other US governmental bilateral 
donors as the second-most important donor in the region. 
(i) Types of funding provided: 
As highlighted in previous studies on donor activities in the Western 
Balkans and donor-driven development more generally, 
international donors providing financial assistance tend to do so 
using competitive calls for proposals for project grants typically 
lasting 12-24 months. Although several commentaries
7
 have long 
indicated that such strategies are ineffective and create project 
administration capacities instead of competencies directly related 
to long-term civil society development, over 80% of the 
respondents to the questionnaire reported that they provide short-
term project grants. The second most prevalent type of financial 
assistance was regional/cross-national funding, which, in a region of 
new, often weak and fragile states with porous borders, suggests a 
commitment on behalf of donors to build transnational ties and to 
secure knowledge networks and capacities across the region rather 
than just within individual states. It also perhaps suggests that 
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 Janine R. Wedel Collision and collusion: the strange case of western aid to Eastern 
Europe New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
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donors recognise the importance of building transactional activism 
capacities. The term transactional is used as defined by Petrova and 
Tarrow, referring to building ‘ties—enduring and temporary—
among organised non-state actors and between them and political 
parties, power holders, and other institutions’.
8
 
Nearly 30% of the sample funded service contracts and tenders 
(though it was not indicated whether this assistance was targeting 
private companies or CSOs). Only 26% of the respondents provided 
long-term core funding to recipients not tied to particular projects, 
or what was described as ‘programme funding’ for an extended 
period (e.g. five years). Of additional responses supplied by donors 
that were not included in the survey question, one organisation 
provided CSOs with funding as implementing partners for the 
donor's regional projects; another channelled funds through various 
CSOs as a re-granting mechanism (i.e. trained the organisations to 
act as local donors).  
If the sample is divided by donor type (i.e. whether the respondent 
is from a multilateral, bilateral or private agency), the lack of core 
funding, particularly from multilateral donors is evident, whilst 
around one-third of the other donor types provided financial 
assistance not linked to specific projects. On the other hand, nearly 
half of the multilateral respondents offered service contracts, which 
was significantly higher than the proportion for private and bilateral 
donors. The results are presented in Figure B.  
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Studies January 2007 vol. 40 no. 1 74-94 
  
[12] 
FIGURE B: Types of Funding by Donor Type 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asked what types of funding they provide (by donor 
type). They could select as many as they felt were relevant. 
 
(ii) Activities and funding strategies: 
The focus on strategies to build networking or transactional 
capacities is also clearly evident in responses regarding the types of 
activities that donors support. Over 80% of the respondents were 
funding network building activities and over 85% provided support 
for activities relating to building stronger engagement between 
CSOs and governmental institutions, i.e. policy advocacy. However, 
the most popular activity funded by donors remains more basic, 
fundamental training and capacity building for CSOs in the target 
countries. Some of the respondents also identified “other” areas, 
such as media training, cultural activities, and watchdog activities. 
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In line with the findings in Figure B, multilateral donors were most 
likely to fund activities relating to service provision compared to 
their bilateral and private donor counterparts. Interestingly, 
bilateral donor respondents did not support educational activities as 
much as other types of donors. Amongst the different respondent 
types (bilateral, multilateral and private foundations) there were 
quite similar levels of support for the three other categories 
(training; networking; and policy advocacy). The results are shown 
in Figure C. 
FIGURE C: Activities funded (by donor type) 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asked to indicate which activities they funded. They could 
select as many as they felt were relevant. (n=48) 
 
(iii) Co-operation and interaction between donors: 
Co-operation and networking between and amongst donors occurs: 
approximately 60% of respondents have regular contact with other 
donors, although the proportion of donors reporting that they are in 
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contact with others, but not regularly, was high (40%). The 
proportion of donors who do not co-operate with other agencies is 
reassuringly very small (less than 2%); those that co-operate on a 
daily basis is also small (approximately 4%).  
Overall, respondents indicated a moderate amount of interaction 
with other donors working on the Western Balkans, with none 
admitting that they have ‘no idea what other donors are doing’. 
However, only 34% work closely with other donors, whilst a 
majority of respondents (over 60%) have some knowledge about 
the activities of other donors in the country and in the region, but 
do not have a direct, structured relationship. 
FIGURE D: Donor Relationships (by donor type) 
 
NOTE: Donors were asked how they would describe their relationship with other 
donors (by donor type). (n=47) 
If the data are now examined for the different types of donors, the 
proportion in the sample working closely with other donors is 
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slightly higher for bilateral donors, whereas a slightly higher 
proportion of multilateral donors have a good idea of what others 
are doing. This may be evidence of differences between multilateral 
and bilateral donors in the way each views and implements inter-
donor coordination (multilaterals are likely to find it easier to work 
and co-operate with other multilaterals, whereas bilateral donors 
are wedded to states and national budgets, and therefore less likely 
to engage with others). Private donors, compared with 
governmental and multilateral institutions, have less overall 
capacity, and higher proportions of these respondents either know 
only roughly, or do not know at all the activities of other donors. 
The results are shown in Figure D. 
Perceptions about inter-donor co-ordination also seem to vary 
between representatives from regional offices compared to those 
working at the country level: amongst respondents in the study 
from country offices, a higher proportion believed that donors work 
closely together, compared to their counterparts working in 
regional donor offices, who have a good idea of what others are 
doing, but not how the interaction takes place. This may be 
explained in terms of the former's proximity to the delivery of 
projects on the ground and the day-to-day realities of working in a 
particular country compared to strategic planning across the region. 
 
(iv) Funding priorities: 
Regarding the specific topics that were prioritized by the donors 
that responded to the questionnaire, most view the development of 
capacities through training and technical assistance as being of 
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paramount importance. Democracy-building and citizen 
participation receive a similar level of focus as funding priorities. 
Due to the compound legacies of conflict (with the exception 
Albania or Macedonia) and the authoritarian past, the topic of 
marginalised groups (including displaced persons) was also 
indicated by two-thirds of the sample as a main funding priority. 
Respondents also identified other priorities not included in the 
survey question such as local development (including rural 
development), justice, gender/women’s issues, and transnational 
co-operation. What this indicates is that donors continue to address 
fundamental issues of social and economic reconstruction, whilst 
post-materialist concerns such as the environment and nature 
protection are of much less importance.  
FIGURE E: Main Funding Priorities (divided by donor type) 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asking what their main funding priorities are. They could 
select as many as they felt were relevant (n=48) 
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If these priorities are now divided by donor type, multilateral 
respondents supported environmental protection more than other 
types of donors. Private foundations seem to focus slightly less on 
capacity building compared to the others, which could be a function 
of lower capacities to implement such programmes. Although the 
level of support for marginalized groups as a priority seems higher 
for multilateral respondents, many of the ‘other’ responses (listed 
by bilateral and private foundations) mentioned women’s issues 
and justice, and so the differences between the three types of 
donors is not quite as pronounced as it appears. The results are 
shown in Figure E. 
 
(v) Agenda setting, co-ordination and planning:  
Donor priorities are determined, for the most part, by offices 
located in the region, or through a dialogue between the 
headquarters outside the Western Balkans and the country office. 
Of the five respondents who indicated other mechanisms for 
determining development strategies, three rely on a board or 
steering committee; one respondent mentioned a joint decision-
making process between the donor and local partners; and one 
donor programme office based in the region sets priorities with the 
headquarters of the bilateral development agency. Just over 25% of 
the respondents revealed that priorities are set by the head office. 
The results are presented in Figure F. 
If the responses are now divided by donor type, priorities are 
developed by the country office in similar proportions. There are 
differences with the private foundations, but this could be due to 
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the fact that many of the foundations that participated in the survey 
have headquarters offices outside the region, but do not necessarily 
have country offices.  
Country-focused and regional respondents answered differently 
regarding where priorities are set for civil society development. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, respondents from regional offices believed 
that the headquarters/regional office set the priorities more often 
than the country offices. However, by contrast, officials working at 
the country offices and country desks who replied to the survey 
largely believed that the agenda for civil society was set evenly by 
regional/headquarter offices and the country offices/desks.  
Regional offices exist, by and large, to plan and develop regional 
strategies. 
FIGURE F: Priorities and funding development leaders in each 
donor organization? (n=47) 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asked who leads the development of priorities and 
funding in their donor organizations. 
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(vi) Donors and CSOs – patterns of interaction and perceptions: 
The analysis will now turn to the interaction between the 
international donor organisations and local CSOs. There were only 
three respondents who said that civil society was effective in the 
region, and no responses recording that civil society is non-existent. 
The remainder of the responses preferred more intermediate 
options about the state of civil society: the most popular response 
(73%) was that civil society was donor-dependent, but that it can 
represent interests; more worryingly, nearly two-thirds of the 
survey responses (63%) noted that civil society is unevenly 
developed and unsustainable. Of the respondents that provided 
“other” responses, two mentioned that the civil society sector is 
divided and politicized, another response underlined that the civil 
society sector is constantly evolving and beginning to engage with 
governmental institutions in some places, and one respondent 
mentioned that the situation varies significantly amongst countries 
in the region. 
Although none of the respondents chose the most pessimistic 
option, over a quarter of the private donor respondents believed 
that civil society is very weak, with lower proportions for the other 
types of donors. However, private foundation respondents were 
generally more positive than other types of donors, with nearly 90% 
answering that ‘civil society requires support from donors, but is 
able to function and represent interests’, and around 16% agreeing 
that ‘civil society is effective’. This may be explained by the fact that 
private foundations (as opposed to multilateral or bilateral donors) 
deliver relatively modest amounts of funding to a small pool of local 
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CSOs, whom they get to know well and work with closely, usually 
over a longer period of time; whereas they may know the CSOs with 
whom they work particularly well, they may have a less extensive 
knowledge of civil society at large. Moreover, private foundation 
usually are the only donors offering longer-term core funding (see 
Figure B2 above) and this is perhaps key to understanding why they 
identify uneven development and express a concern about the 
sustainability of civil society (which relies heavily on the core 
funding they provide), but equally acknowledge that civil society is 
able to ‘function and represent interests’. The results are shown in 
Table G. 
TABLE G: Descriptions of civil society in the region?  
(divided by donor type) 
 Multilateral Bilateral Private 
 n % n % n % 
Civil society does not exist or 
function in the country 
/region in which we operate 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Civil society exists, but is very 
weak and undeveloped 
1 7.69 1 6.25 5 26.32 
Civil society exists, but is 
unevenly developed and 
unsustainable 
8 61.54 8 50.00 14 73.68 
Civil society is weak but 
becoming stronger 
5 38.46 7 43.75 7 36.84 
Civil society requires support 
from donors, but is able to 
function and represent 
interests 
9 69.23 9 56.25 17 89.47 
Civil society is effective 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 15.79 
Other 2 15.38 2 12.50 2 10.53 
NOTE: Respondents were asked how they would describe civil society in the region. 
They could select as many as they felt were relevant (n=48) 
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Regarding the CSOs within these countries (as opposed to civil 
society generally), almost all (90%) of the donors that participated in 
the research noted that local organisations were dependent on 
donors. Half of the donors said that CSOs function but lack capacity, 
whilst over 60% had a more positive evaluation, believing that CSOs 
are developing and gaining influence. Donors providing “other” 
responses also noted that CSOs needed to spend more time 
fostering relationships with local communities and governmental 
institutions instead of pursuing donor priorities. However, it is 
difficult to make generalizations across the region: several 
respondents also wrote that the situation varies greatly in the 
region, depending on the donor presence and CSO-governmental 
relations. The results are presented in Figure J. 
FIGURE J: Descriptions of the organisation(s) with whom donors 
work (Divided by donor type) 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asked how they would describe the organisation(s) with 
whom they work. They could select as many as they felt were relevant.  
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Private donors in the survey sample also seem more positive 
towards CSOs, with nearly a quarter of respondents believing that 
local CSOs are effective and have capacity. The responses to this 
question were consistent across the options, except for a lower 
proportion of bilateral donor respondents believing that CSOs 
function but lack capacity compared to multilateral and private 
donors. The results are shown in Figure H. 
FIGURE H: Evaluation of CSOs in the country / region?  
(Divided by donor type) 
 
NOTE: Respondents were asked how they would evaluate CSOs in the country / 
region. They could select as many as they felt were relevant (n=48) 
 
Respondents to the questionnaire refrained from giving overly 
negative opinions about their interaction with local CSO partners in 
the Western Balkans, with none of the responses reflecting opinions 
about ‘a lot of work remaining to be done’, lack of effective co-
operation, or contemplation of leaving the country/region. Of the 
remaining options, donors in the sample did indicate that there was 
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a partnership, but less than 30% said that CSOs are proactive and 
take initiative in designing/proposing activities. In other words, 
there may be a partnership, but it is one that is still led largely by 
the international agencies. The results are presented in Table I. 
TABLE I: Donor relationships with the organisations the support 
(n=47) 
Response Freq. % 
It is a partnership - they appreciate our assistance and we 
work well together 
26 55.32 
They are learning to work in partnership with us and to 
deliver what we want and expect 
7 14.89 
They take initiative in proposing projects/activities which 
we then support 
14 29.79 
There is still a lot of work to be done 0 0.00 
We do not co-operate effectively 0 0.00 
We are contemplating ending our involvement 0 0.00 
NOTE: Respondents were asked how they would describe their relationship with 
the organisations they support (n=47) 
If the responses are divided by donor type, private foundation 
respondents to the questionnaire see their interaction with local 
CSOs more as a partnership, with 68% choosing this option, versus 
lower percentages for the other types of donors. Again, this may 
well be explained in terms of private foundations having a closer 
and longer-term interaction with a narrow band of CSOs. However, 
private donors also seemed to indicate that their local partners 
were not proactive in initiating proposals, whilst 40% of the 
respondents from bilateral donors believed that local CSOs shaped 
their projects and activities. 
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There was also an observed difference in perceptions about local 
CSOs between country-based donors, and those working at a 
regional level: only one response from the latter category believed 
that local CSOs are learning to work in partnership, whilst nearly a 
quarter of the replies from country offices/desks selected this 
option. Again, this apparent discrepancy in perceptions may be 
explained in terms of those donors working within individual 
countries engaging more closely with local CSO networks and having 
a more nuanced sense of emerging partnerships.  
Nonetheless, the donors seem largely to have a positive opinion 
overall about the capacities of the CSOs with which they work. Less 
than 30% of the respondents worked with small organisations with 
low levels of capacity, whilst over three-quarters of the donors that 
participated in the research reported that they worked with small 
and medium-sized organisations (one of the ‘other’ responses wrote 
that there are also small organisations with developing expertise 
and capacities), and over 60% of the respondents wrote that the 
local CSOs with which they worked are professional.  
These findings can suggest one of two things: either that the 
existing scholarly assessment of local CSOs in the Western Balkans 
has been overly pessimistic and that the level of capacities is not as 
bad as widely reported, or only CSOs with developed capacities 
interact with international donors. In other words, the smaller local 
organisations with low or moderate capacities are either excluded 
from the orbit of donor funding, or are increasingly marginalized by 
the process of allocation. 
There is some evidence that the major donors in the region tend to 
build and bolster organisations with existing capacities, instead of 
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supporting smaller CSOs. This is evidenced by the fact that only 15% 
of the multilateral respondents worked with smaller CSOs, whilst 
over one-third of the private foundation donors in the sample did 
so. But it is not necessarily the case that donors only work with the 
most successful CSOs.  
Indeed, the interview data reveal that multilateral donors seem to 
work less with organisations that lead networks, favouring instead a 
tier of mid-ranking successful 'client' organisations that succeed in 
obtaining project funding in each project round, but remain 
dependent on donors. This corroborates the earlier finding that 
multilateral donors, more than other types of donors, are more 
inclined to provide funding for the provision of services rather than 
political advocacy. All of the private foundation donors in the 
questionnaire sample worked with medium-sized organisations, and 
nearly 60% worked with CSOs that led networks. This suggests that 
the private foundations focus more on working with local CSOs and 
CSO networks compared to their multilateral and bilateral 
counterparts. This may mean that governmental and multilateral 
agencies neglect smaller CSOs and networks, or more positively, the 
approaches by private and other types of donors in the Western 
Balkans complement each other. The results are shown in Figure J. 
Unsurprisingly, as with the other questions in the survey, 
respondents did not select the most negative or pessimistic options. 
For donor impact, there were no responses for the option that their 
involvement has been ‘a waste of time and money’, and only one 
donor replied that donors had not helped civil society development. 
On the other hand, 39% of the participants believed that civil 
society would not exist without donors, though 35% of the 
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respondents believed that support could have been used more 
effectively. Nearly one-third of the respondents had a positive view 
of donor impact, i.e. that funding created professional CSOs and 
that donor support has created sustainable civil society. The most 
popular answers were more cautiously positive, with 67% of 
respondents replying that donors had strengthened civil society on 
the whole and that donors have created leading CSOs (though not 
throughout the sector). Similarly, participants in the survey replied 
that donors had created professional individuals in civil society, but 
had not developed the whole sector. The results are presented in 
Table K. 
TABLE K: Descriptions of the impact of donor funding in the 
country/region 
Response n % 
Donor funding has strengthened civil society generally 31 67.39 
Donor funding has created several leading and 
professional CSOs and not the whole sector 
31 67.39 
Donor funding has created professional 
individuals/experts in CSD and not the whole sector 
21 45.65 
Civil society would not exist without donors 18 39.13 
Donors could have used their resources more 
effectively 
16 34.78 
Donor funding has created professional CSOs 15 32.61 
Donor funding has built capacities and helped create 
sustainable civil society 
15 32.61 
Donor funding has not helped to build civil society 1 2.17 
Donor funding has weakened civil society 1 2.17 
Donor funding has been a waste of time and money 0 0 
NOTE: Respondents were asked how they would describe the impact of donor 
funding in the country / region.  They could select as many as they felt were 
relevant (n=46). Responses have been sorted with the most popular options listed 
first.  
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4. Identifying problems with civil society development
9
  
There seemed to be a broad consensus amongst the donor 
organisations across the region about the problems facing CSOs and 
civil society development in the Western Balkans. The concerns 
raised are also familiar criticisms levelled at NGOs and externally-
funded civil society development globally. The main concern 
expressed by several donors was dependency: one of the private 
foundations referred to civil society as ‘project society’, since the 
survival of CSOs depends on continuing short-term grants to retain 
staff and to complete projects. According to another foundation 
operating in the region, donor priorities steer the activities of CSOs, 
so local organisations focus more on chasing international money 
rather than focusing on their core activities. A side effect of this is 
that CSOs, instead of working together on issues of common 
concern and expertise, find themselves in competition with each 
other, creating a weakened civil society voice in the country and in 
the region. A large bilateral donor based in Kosovo noted that 
competition amongst local CSOs has diluted their potential power. 
One of the bilateral European development agencies active in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed out that this project-driven strategy has 
also weakened long-term governance-building, since capacity 
building has been driven by donors, not by the countries 
themselves, resulting in weak co-ordination and co-operation 
between state and non-state actors. More importantly, by pursuing 
donor initiatives instead of listening to the needs of citizens, CSOs 
have become unaccountable, and according to one regional 
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would be anonymous. Thus, attributions in this section only refer to the donor type 
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foundation, CSOs in the Western Balkans suffer from an ‘inability to 
genuinely blend with the society’. In Albania, one of the country 
offices for a bilateral development agency stressed the need for 
better internal accountability and transparency amongst CSOs, since 
many have non-member decision-making processes.  
Other respondents also indicated that the financial weakness leaves 
CSOs vulnerable to politicization or marginalization by political 
parties, especially since donors are gradually shifting their priorities 
to other parts of the world and are leaving the Western Balkans. 
One of the large bilateral development agencies active in Bosnia-
Herzegovina noted that there are no alternative revenue streams 
for CSOs, since governmental assistance is given in an 
unaccountable and non-transparent way, and the business sector 
does not as yet see CSOs as potential partners. Due to the lack of 
long-term certainty, CSOs are often dependent on political parties 
and may become interwoven with party political interests and 
agendas, as pointed out by a private foundation active in Serbia. In 
Macedonia, one bilateral development agency noted that local 
organisations are reluctant to speak out against the government. 
One of the multilateral agencies in Albania also identified political 
independence as a problem with CSOs in the country. Another 
related problem associated with the weakness of CSOs and low 
sustainability is that there is a high turnover of staff and thus, there 
is no accumulation of expertise. The high turnover of CSO staff was 
noted by an international organisation working in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and by a European bilateral development agency 
working in Kosovo. 
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Since respondents to the questionnaire identified USAID and the EU 
as the two most important donors in the Western Balkans, it is 
instructive to briefly examine the problems for CSO development 
identified by representatives of the two donors. The responses of 
the USAID and EU representatives across the region seem to mostly 
identify the same sets of problems, although one EU representative 
identified the uneven development of CSOs, and USAID respondents 
identified the lack of CSO-business partnerships and inter-CSO 
competition as significant obstacles to CSO development in the 
Western Balkans. The results are shown in Table L. 
TABLE L: Main problems with CSOs identified by one or more 
respondents, for USAID and the EU 
 EU USAID 
Lack of sustainability x x 
Unevenly developed x  
No financial autonomy x x 
No social responsibility or civic engagement x x 
Lack of transparency regarding public sources of funding x x 
Dependence on donor funding x x 
Lack of trust from citizens x x 
Lack of capacities (technical, knowledge, fundraising, etc.) x x 
Lack of political independence x x 
CSOs and the business sector are not in partnership  x 
CSOs compete amongst themselves, and do not co-
operate 
 x 
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In sum, there were four main problems for civil society 
development identified by respondents that are evident in all parts 
of the Western Balkans: 
Most CSOs have relatively low capacity, and even the more 
successful organisations have developed project management 
capacities only through pursuing donor priorities, not via locally 
driven initiatives. As a result of the over-dependence on donor 
funding, CSOs have not developed alternative fund-raising 
strategies, and the state and private sector do not have the interest 
or accountability to fill the gap as donors gradually focus on other 
parts of the world. This leaves CSOs vulnerable to political pressures 
without having a partnership with governmental actors. Due to the 
attention paid to donor priorities, CSOs have become detached from 
their local constituencies and, as a result, there is low trust amongst 
citizens in these countries towards CSOs. As a result of these 
weaknesses, there is high turnover of CSO staff, so it is difficult to 
build a pool of expertise in the civil society sector. 
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5. Examples of ‘Best Practice’ 
Despite these problems, respondents were also asked to provide 
specific examples of best practice in their own involvement in civil 
society development in the Western Balkans. As suggested from 
Figures B and E above, there are two types of work that donors tend 
to undertake. The first is fundamental capacity-building work for the 
private and public sectors, to increase participation of the target 
group in political processes. The second is to augment and construct 
links between pivotal state and non-state actors, in order to build 
national and regional policy networks.  
Participation/capacity building examples: 
USAID developed CSO capacities through their Civil Society 
Strengthening Project (CSSP), which was implemented separately in 
Macedonia and in Kosovo. In Macedonia, the programme supported 
approximately 150 CSOs in 34 cities, building up their organisational 
capabilities. Moreover, the programme also addressed the policy 
environment in which CSOs operate by advocating for a more 
permissive legal framework towards CSOs. The CSSP in Kosovo also 
worked to change the legal mechanisms related to CSOs, with local 
organisations being given training in how to respond to and better 
articulate the needs of their constituencies. 
OSCE in Macedonia supported the CSO “Centre for Continuous 
Education of the Macedonian Judges Association”, which became a 
national training academy for judges and barristers in 1999 and is 
now supported by the government. The OSCE initially provided 
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institutional support and strategic guidance for handling war crime 
cases and conducting criminal trials. 
The Olof Palme Center office in Belgrade, a donor organisation 
funded by SIDA, worked with the European Movement in Serbia (a 
well-funded CSO with high levels of capacity) to implement a project 
on social entrepreneurship in Serbia. This has included advocacy by 
the European Movement in Serbia and other CSOs to change 
legislation in the country. A regional project on social enterprise and 
entrepreneurship was also implemented by the UNDP Bratislava 
Regional Centre (another respondent) in 2005-7. 
Examples of building civil society networks: 
 In the area of social enterprise, the UniCredit Foundation (Italy 
and global division) supported two networks of social 
entrepreneurs in Serbia and Croatia. These networks advocated 
the development of a better legal framework. The project 
included capacity building for local social enterprises, a study 
visit to meet with their Italian counterparts, and participation 
in conferences on social economy and local development. 
 The Heinrich Boell Foundation office in Serbia identified the 
CSO study visits to EU Member States as their most effective 
activity. These visits are particularly important since they offers 
local CSOs the opportunity to build stronger local, national and 
regional CSO networks when they return to their respective 
countries in the Western Balkans. 
 The EU Delegation in Serbia oversaw the IPA 2007 (2 million 
Euros) to support cooperation between professional 
organisations in Serbia and the EU by strengthening contacts 
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and a mutual exchange of experience between the business 
community, professional organisations and social partners. IPA 
2008 prioritised building networks between local CSOs and 
organizations in EU Member States. 
 The Balkan Trust for Democracy runs a programme across the 
entities that led to the establishment of new student council 
networks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and brought together 
representatives from these networks to train participants on 
public advocacy, policy development, communication, 
networking, and research into needs assessment. 
 The Open Society Foundation in Macedonia has worked to 
open twelve NGO Support Centres (NGOSCs), set up in order to 
strengthen the NGO sector outside the capital, Skopje. In this 
endeavour the OSF worked in conjunction with the EAR and 
SDC. NGOSCs strengthened CSO capacities in their communities 
and initiated cooperation, coordination and joint actions 
amongst local organisations, as well as with local government, 
media, and the business sector. NGOSCs have subsequently 
encouraged the development of CSO coalitions and networks 
and increased their impact on issues of public interest. 
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6. Discussion and Recommendations  
Despite the aforementioned limitations of the survey data, the 
research has provided a significant amount of information about 
past and present donor activities, from which it is possible to 
suggest a series of recommendations. 
It is first instructive to revisit the questions listed at the beginning of 
the study: 
 What is the donor understanding of civil society 
development? Although the respondents were bilateral, 
multilateral, and private donors, with significant variation in 
budgets and experience in the region, there was a consensus 
amongst those who completed the questionnaire regarding the 
persisting problems faced by civil society and CSOs in the 
region. The over-riding perception is of CSOs as service 
providers, partners for projects, and sources of potential 
knowledge and expertise. Most donors identified the 
importance of engaging local and smaller organisations rather 
than just working with large well-established organisations or 
networks. The vast majority also emphasised the importance of 
engaging CSOs with governmental or multilateral agencies, as 
well as the importance of network building. 
 What proportion of aid is deployed towards supporting 
watchdog activities, capacity-building, networking or 
activism? As shown in Figure C, almost all of the respondents 
have undertaken CSO training and/or technical assistance. 
Donors also seemed to focus heavily on network-building and 
advocacy activities. This confirms research conducted in parts 
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of the Western Balkans and in post-socialist Central and 
Eastern Europe showing that instead of simply funding direct 
action or participatory projects, international donors have 
tended to prioritise transactional activities, or activities that 
promote stronger links (domestically and regionally) between 
governmental and Non-Governmental actors, and amongst 
Non-Governmental actors. 
 What are the preferred mechanisms for delivering support 
(i.e. project grants, tenders)?  Despite the criticism levelled at 
short-term project grants as a development tool for civil 
society, most donors (80%) still channel their assistance 
predominantly or entirely through grants for projects typically 
lasting for 24 months or less (Figure B). By contrast, long-term 
core or programme funding, which most of the larger CSOs in 
the region have secured, is only provided by less than a quarter 
of the donors that responded to the questionnaire. 
 Is duplication of initiatives, or indeed conflicts between 
donors, really such a problem? Does co-ordination take place, 
informally if not formally? Are there any synergies and the 
exchange of best practice? Insofar as donors discussed their 
various initiatives, it was revealed that many international 
agencies and foundations active in the region are either 
focusing specifically on Kosovo, or are moving away from 
country-focused activities towards fostering cross-border or 
regional linkages. Perhaps due to the differing capacities, both 
the questionnaire and the interview data suggest that larger 
donors and smaller donors have complementary activities, 
though they may work around similar themes. Larger donors 
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tend to work more on top-down strategies and may employ 
service provision, whereas smaller donors seem more likely to 
use core funding and target localised grassroots development. 
Despite these complementary activities, there is still 
insufficient co-ordination, since private foundations tended to 
be less informed about other donors’ activities.  
 Is there real and effective collaboration between donors and 
local stakeholders, especially local civil society organisations 
(CSOs)? If so, at what stage (i.e. design, implementation, and 
evaluation) and how does it occur? The results from Table K 
suggest that most respondents believe that there is a 
partnership between local CSOs and donors which works well. 
However, if the regional and country offices are analysed 
separately, a larger proportion of international actors believe 
that local CSOs are still learning to become effective partners, 
whilst only one regional office representative chose this option. 
Less than one-third of the donors that completed the 
questionnaire believed that CSOs were taking a proactive role 
in setting programme priorities (Table K), which indicates that 
most CSOs are not involved in activities such as programme 
design and evaluation. Although respondents avoided selecting 
the most pessimistic options regarding existing CSO capacities, 
the results from Figure H and Figure J suggest that donors are 
aware of the dependence of local organisations on funding and 
other assistance from international sources. 
 Do donors really value networking and the knowledge 
formation value of CSOs? The interesting finding from the 
narrative responses of self-selected examples of best practice is 
  
[37] 
that whether a donor is a large bilateral/multilateral agency or 
a private foundation, there are two types of activities on which 
donors tend to focus: developing basic and participatory 
capacities; and building local, national and/or regional 
networks that include CSOs. 
 
Drawing on the findings above, there are FOUR recommendations 
to improve donor efforts to develop civil society and CSOs in the 
Western Balkans: 
 Institutional legacies: The Western Balkans had been the focus 
of international development agencies since the 1990s and the 
onset of violent conflict, but the focus has now shifted to the 
post-conflict and/or democratizing states of South Asia, North 
Africa and the Middle East. Many of the donors that have 
previously worked in the Western Balkans have not only 
departed, but they have not left any way for local and 
international actors in the region to build on their work or 
legacies. Knowledge of previous programmes is extremely 
patchy and uncertain. This makes duplicating work more likely, 
but also allows the same errors to be made. One way to deal 
with this is to create an online repository for summaries of 
donor activities/programmes that are accessible by other 
donors, governmental actors, and CSOs. For example, it would 
be a valuable resource to current actors involved in civil society 
development to learn from the work of DFID, which has closed 
all of its offices in the region except for the mission in Pristina. 
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 Sharing best practice: A related problem is that although 
international agencies are in contact with one another, the 
interaction is mostly not regular. Since there are strong 
constraints on time and financial resources to meet physically, 
one possible solution is a web-based database or weblog that 
contains examples of best practice projects submitted by the 
donors to share their experiences of civil society development 
with other donors as well as with local CSOs. This database 
would have the added value of bringing CSOs into the process. 
 Grassroots networking: The research has revealed a concerted 
effort amongst the major multilateral and bilateral donors to 
create national and regional networks of CSOs, and to build 
networks linking smaller organisations with larger ones. The 
major challenges are: to change attitudes towards CSOs 
amongst citizens and help foster legitimacy; and to build levels 
of basic capacity. Both can be dealt with by focusing on 
building stronger links (through technical assistance and 
training) between grassroots/community organisations and 
newly established (and donor supported) CSOs, and 
encouraging both types of organisation to engage with local 
authorities and access resources and know-how. 
 Information from the CSO sector: There have been previous 
attempts at building a reliable and comprehensive census of 
CSOs in the Western Balkans, such as on-going measures to 
register active CSOs by the European Commission.
10
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CSOs - even those working within the same local areas – will 
remain unaware of the activities of other organisations. 
Moreover, if donor strategies are to be responsive and 
appropriate, as much data on CSOs as possible is required, 
particularly levels of capacity, the numbers of employees and 
basic resources of organisations, and the networks and 
partnerships that are established.  
Despite two decades of experience in the region, the main donors 
chiefly continue to work with only a moderate level of inter-donor 
co-ordination, primarily funding larger CSOs through short-term 
projects, thus perpetuating some of the problems identified in the 
existing academic and policy literature on civil society development. 
On the other hand, larger bilateral and multilateral donors work 
with larger CSOs, whilst private foundations are more likely to 
support grassroots organisations, which shows that there is a 
complementary approach amongst donors based on their own 
capacities. Moreover, donor organisations have started to focus on 
building transactional developmental capacities, indicating a longer-
term, post-donor horizon. Thus, our study shows that donor-driven 
civil society development in the Western Balkans continues to 
operate, even with the challenges of donor flight and the global 
financial crisis, but it needs further improvements in inter-donor co-
ordination and information on local CSOs to be more effective. 
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ANNEX:  List of Respondents  
 
DFID (Kosovo) 
ERSTE Foundation 
EU Delegation to Albania 
EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
EU Delegation to Montenegro 
EU Delegation to Serbia 
European Commission, DG Enlargement 
European Cultural Foundation 
European Fund for the Balkans 
Fondacija tuzlanske zajednice 
Foundation Open Society (Albania) 
Foundation Open Society (Macedonia) 
Foundation Open Society (Serbia) 
German Organisation for International Development (Headquarters) 
Heinrich Boell Foundation 
Hungarian Interchurch Aid 
King Baudouin Foundation 
Mott Foundation 
National Endowment for Democracy 
OSCE Mission to Montenegro 
OSCE Mission to Macedonia 
Oak Foundation 
Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA 
(Headquarters) 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Albania) 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Serbia) 
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Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Albania) 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Macedonia) 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Serbia) 
Swiss Cultural Programme in the Western Balkans 
The German Marshall Fund of the US, The Balkan Trust for Democracy 
The Olof Palme International Center (Serbia) 
Think Tank Fund - Open Society Foundations 
UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre 
UNDP (Albania) 
UNDP (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
UNHCR (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
USAID (Albania) 
USAID (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
USAID (Kosovo) 
USAID (Macedonia) 
USAID (Serbia) 
UniCredit Foundation 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
The World Bank (Albania) 
The World Bank (Macedonia)
  
 
